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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jerome L. Korn appeals from the district court's order affirming his
conviction for possessing wild or exotic animals and possessing deleterious
exotic animals, claiming the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and
declining to admit certain evidence at trial.

Statement of the Facts
The state charged Korn with possessing wild or exotic animals in violation
of Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-z1 (Count I), and possessing deleterious
exotic animals without a permit in violation of I.C. § 25-3905 and IDAPA
02.04.27.111 (Count II). (R., pp.4-5.)

Korn filed a motion to dismiss Count I,

claiming Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2 "violates the contract clause of the
U.S. and Idaho Constitutions" as applied to Korn.

(R., p.6.)

The magistrate

denied the motion. (8/4/06 Tr., p.39, L.16 - p.40, L.25; R., p.11.)
At trial, Korn pursued a necessity defense.

Korn testified that due to a

bankruptcy court order requiring him to sell his property in Nampa, where he had
a permit to keep his animals, he and his animals were forced to relocate. (Trial
Tr., p.127, Ls.6-18.) Korn claimed he chose Payette because, at that time, there

' A copy of Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2 is included in the record as Exhibit
1 from the motion to dismiss hearing. A copy of that exhibit is attached hereto as
Appendix A. The state, however, notes that the attached copy of the ordinance
erroneously identifies the section numbers as 6-5-1, 6-5-2, and 6-5-3, rather than
5-6-1, 5-6-2, and 5-6-3, which are the correct section numbers as evidenced by
the reference to Title 5, Chapter 6 in the introductory sentence.

1

were no ordinances prohibiting his possession oftigers. 2 (Trial Tr., p.128, L.7p.130, L.11.) Korn, therefore, with his mother's financial assistance, purchased
property in Payette and began constructing buildings and cages in which to
house his animals.

(Trial Tr., p.129, L.11 - p.130, L.22.)

Although Korn

attempted to obtain the necessary permits, which would allow him to house some
of his animals in Payette County, his permit application was unsuccessful. (Trial
Tr., p.71, L.8 - p.72, L.21, p.83, L.8 - p.85, L.19.)
When Korn ran out of money to complete the construction of his animal
cages, Developers Diversified Realty Corporation ("DDR"), the company who
purchased his Nampa property through the bankruptcy proceedings, "took over"
the project.

(Trial Tr., p.127, L.22 - p.128, L.6, p.131, Ls.5-10, p.133, L.17 -

p.134, L.1 O; Exhibit 3, p.3.) In support of his necessity defense, Korn attempted
to admit, as an exhibit, a bankruptcy court order, that read, in part:
Mike Spink[, counsel for DDR,] is further ordered and directed to
promptly and timely release any and all other DDR funds held in
trust for him for expenses actually incurred or to be incurred in
association with the construction of alternative habitats,
transportation assisted with the removal of the animals from the
Nampa property to the relocation of the Payette, Idaho property.
(Trial Tr., p.157, Ls.4-11; p.167, L.23-p.168, L.16.)
Although Korn read the foregoing excerpt from the document, the court
denied his request to admit the document as an exhibit ("Exhibit F"3), sustaining

2

According to Korn, he looked at the property in Payette around April 29 or April
30, 2005. (Trial Tr., p.129, Ls.2-8.) Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2 was
passed May 23, 2005. (Exhibit 1.) Idaho Code § 25-3901, et seq., was,
however, enacted in 2003. 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 105, § 1.
'A copy of "Exhibit F" is attached hereto as Appendix B.
2

the prosecutor's objection on the grounds that it was inadmissible because it was
not a certified copy. (Trial Tr., p.168, Ls.2-16.) Korn also sought to admit, as an
exhibit ("Exhibit E"4), "an order approving and confirming the sale of the Nampa
real estate from the debtor to DOR outside the ordinary course of business"
(hereinafter "Order Approving and Confirming Sale"), which was also issued in
his bankruptcy case. (Trial Tr., p.166, Ls.2-9.) The court also refused to admit
this document because it was not a certified copy. (Trial Tr., p.166, Ls.21-24.)
A jury convicted Korn of both counts (R., pp.16-17), the magistrate
entered judgment (R., pp.18-19), and Korn appealed (R., pp.22-23). 5 On appeal
to the district court, Korn raised two issues:

(1) the denial of his motion to

dismiss, and (2) the refusal to admit the bankruptcy court orders offered as
Exhibits E and F. (R., pp.38-39.) The district court denied relief (R., pp.38-48),
and Korn timely appealed to this Court (R., pp.50-52).
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A copy of "Exhibit E" is attached hereto as Appendix C.

' Korn also filed a Motion for New Trial (R., pp.20-21); however, it does not
appear the magistrate ever ruled on this motion {see R., pp.2-3).
3

ISSUES

Korn states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the trial Court err by applying the wrong legal standard in
denying Korn's pretrial Motion to Dismiss?
2. Did the trial Court err by failing to allow the admission of the
bankruptcy court orders into evidence at the jury trial?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases .the issues as:
1.
Has Korn failed to establish the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate's denial of Korn's Motion to Dismiss?
2.
Has Korn failed to establish the district court erred in concluding the
magistrate did not abuse it discretion in declining to admit copies of bankruptcy
court orders which were not certified or otherwise properly authenticated?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Korn Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Affirming The Trial
Court's Denial Of Korn's Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
Korn moved to dismiss Count I of the complaint, which alleged a violation

of Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2, claiming the ordinance violated the
contract clause of both the federal and state constitutions.

(R., pp.6-7.) The

magistrate denied Korn's motion (8/4/06 Tr., p.39, L.16 - p.40, L.25), and the
district court affirmed that denial on appeal (R., pp.41-45). Korn claims the denial
of his motion to dismiss was error because, he asserts, the trial court applied the
wrong legal standard and application of the correct legal standard establishes a
constitutional violation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-10.) Korn's claim fails because
he failed to establish a violation of the contract clause.

B.

Standard of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State

v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, _ , 184 P.3d 215, 218 (Ct. App.

2008) (citing Losser

v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, _ , 183 P.3d 758, 760

(2008)).
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which the
appellate court exercises free review. Doe Iv. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 903, 71 P.3d
1040, 1050 (2003).

5

C.

The District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate's Denial Of Korn's
Motion To Dismiss In Light Of Korn's Failure To Establish A Violation Of
The Contract Clause
"Both the United States Constitution, article 1, section 10, and the Idaho

Constitution, article 1, section 16, provide that no law shall impair the obligations
of contract." Lindstrom v. District Bd. of Health Panhandle Dist. I, 109 Idaho 956,
961, 712 P.2d 657, 662 (1985). "The threshold inquiry is 'whether the state law
has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship."
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Company, 459 U.S. 400,
411 (1983) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,244
(1978)).

Implicit in this threshold inquiry is recognition of the fact that "[t]he

constitutional impairment of contracts clause protects only those contractual
obligations already in existence at the time the disputed law is enacted."
Lindstrom, 109 Idaho at 961, 712 P.2d at 662 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co.,
438 U.S. at 241). Thus, in order to establish a violation of the contract clause,
Korn must first show (1) he had a contractual obligation that existed when
Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2 was enacted, and (2) that contract was
substantially impaired as a result of the ordinance.
Even if Korn satisfies this burden, he is still not entitled to relief if there is a
"significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation."

Energy

Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411 (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). "Once a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the
next inquiry is whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of

6

contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character
appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislature's adoption."

l\t. at 412.

Application of the foregoing legal standards to the facts of this case
reveals Korn was not entitled to dismissal of Count I because he failed to
establish Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2 substantially impaired any existing
contract right or obligation. Payette County Ordinance§ 5-6-2 provides:
PROHIBITED ACTS: It shall be unlawful for any person, corporate
or entity to harbor, keep, maintain or possess within the County of
Payette any wild or exotic animal, except those persons who are
expressly licensed or permitted in writing by the Idaho Department
of Fish and Game to keep and/or rehabilitate any such animal so
long as that person or persons are in compliance with the terms of
such a license and the animal kept or rehabilitated is domestic to
the State of Idaho.

(Emphasis and capitalization in original.)
In denying Korn's motion to dismiss, the magistrate did not specifically
decide whether there was a "legal" or "valid" contractual relationship at stake
when the ordinance was passed. (8/4/06 Tr., p.39, Ls.21-24.) Instead, the court
effectively assumed the existence of such a contract, and focused on whether
there was a "significant legitimate public purpose behind the regulation" and
whether there was substantial impairment of any of Korn's contractual
obligations. (8/4/06 Tr., p.39, L.25 - p.40, L.22.) The court denied Korn's motion
finding a "significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation of exotic
animals," which "can be dangerous." (8/4/06 Tr., p.41, Ls.3-7.) The magistrate
further concluded there was no "impairment of any contract whatsoever" because
Korn did not obtain any of the necessary permits. (8/4/06 Tr., p.40, Ls.16-22.)
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The district court, on appeal, similarly concluded there was no "substantial
impairment" because Korn did not have a "right" to possess animals in Payette
without the appropriate permits.

(R., pp.43-44.)

Unlike the magistrate, the

district court did not analyze whether there was a "legitimate public purpose for
enactment of the ordinance," concluding such an analysis was unnecessary
because Korn failed to establish substantial impairment. (R., pp.44-45.)
On this appeal, Korn claims error in the denial of his motion to dismiss,
asserting he "had a contractual right to have his mother and DDR construct a
facility for the animals and house them in the County," and that enactment of
Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2 "substantially impaired" his rights because, he
claims, the ordinance "made the facility worthless ... since he could not house
his animals there" and "deprived [him] of the benefit of a $600,000.00 facility
which could not be duplicated due to orders of the federal Bankruptcy Court that
ratified Korn's, his mother's and DDR's agreement initially." (Appellant's Brief,
p.8.) Korn's argument fails for several reasons.
First, Korn failed to establish he was a party to any relevant contract at the
time Payette County passed Ordinance § 5-6-2. While Korn's mother provided
him financial assistance in purchasing property and initiating construction of a
new habitat for Korn's animals, this by no means constitutes a contractual
obligation requiring Korn to house animals on that particular property.

Korn's

obligation to DDR to remove the animals from his Nampa property likewise did
not contractually obligate Korn to move the animals specifically to Payette.

In

fact, the actual sales agreement between DDR and Korn contains no reference
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to the Payette property. (Appendix C ("Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Real
Property" attached as Exhibit to the Order Approving and Confirming Sale).)
Moreover, the sales agreement which required Korn to remove the animals from
the Nampa property was not executed until June 15, 2005 (Id.), almost one
month after the ordinance was passed (Appendix A).

As such, there was no

relevant contractual obligation in existence when Payette County Ordinance § 56-2 was enacted. 6 Korn cannot, therefore, establish a violation of the contract
clause. Lindstrom, 109 Idaho at 961, 712 P.2d at 662.
Second, even if Korn had some viable contract obligation in existence
when Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2 was passed, Korn's contractual
obligations were not substantially impaired as a result of the ordinance.

"In

determining the extent of the impairment, [the court is] to consider whether the
industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past."
Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411.

The State of Idaho has regulated the

possession and importation of "deleterious exotic animals" since the enactment
of I.C. § 25-3901, et seq., in 2003. Korn candidly admitted he had not obtained
the necessary permits for the Payette property (8/4/06 Tr., p.27, L.23 - p.29,
L.12); thus, even if the Payette County Ordinance did not prohibit the possession

' The bankruptcy court's order approving and confirming the sale of the Nampa
property to DOR upon which Korn relies (Appellant's Brief, p.8), was also not
executed until after passage of the ordinance.
(See Appendix C, Order
Approving and Confirming Sale, p.14, dated June 23, 2005.) Furthermore, like
the sales agreement, the bankruptcy court's order contains no reference to the
Payette property. (See generally Appendix C.) The only reference to the
Payette property by the bankruptcy court appears in an order dated August 18,
2005, in which the bankruptcy court orders the release of funds for the purpose
of moving the animals from the Nampa property to the Payette property. (See
Appendix B.)
9

of tigers altogether, Korn failed to establish any substantial impairment as a
result of the ordinance because he was still prohibited by other laws from moving
the tigers to Payette.
Even if Korn had complied with the permitting requirements of I.C. § 253901, et seq., and the related regulations, the county ordinance did not otherwise
impair his substantial rights and obligations under either his "contract" with his
mother or DDR. Neither "contract" afforded Korn the "right" to possess tigers in
Payette, and neither "contract" obligated him to move his tigers and giraffe to
Payette. The terms of Korn's "contract" with his mother are unclear. According
to Korn, his "agreement" with his mother was only that the Payette property
would be used "for [him] to live in" and "for the home for the animals." (8/4/06
Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.3.) Korn's contract with DOR only obligated him to move
his animals off the Nampa property. (Appendix C.) While Korn expended money
in Payette, with the assistance of DOR, in an effort to satisfy this obligation, these
expenditures did not require him to move his tigers or his giraffe to Payette - the
only animals the state alleged Korn possessed in violation of the ordinance. (R.,
pp.4-5.) Korn had a number of other animals including a bear, a cougar, several
elk, "valuable birds," snakes, a crocodile, tortoises, squirrels, and "various breeds
of parrots," which were also moved from his Nampa property to the property in
Payette with DDR's financial assistance (Exhibit 6 admitted at 8/4/06 Hrg., pp.89), which were not the subject of the state's criminal complaint.

Thus, Korn's

assertion that "the County enacted an ordinance that made the facility worthless .
. . since he could not house his animals there" and that, as a result, he has been
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"deprived ... of the benefit of a $600,000.00 facility" (Appellant's Brief, p.8), is
clearly contradicted by the record.

Moreover, Korn's mere desire to keep the

tigers and the giraffe and his lack of resources to move them somewhere else
(8/4/06 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-25, p.19, L.7 - p.20, L.10), do not constitute contractual
rights or obligations.
Third, even assuming Korn could establish Payette County Ordinance § 56-2 substantially impaired an existing contract obligation, the ordinance has a
significant and legitimate public purpose and the "rights and responsibilities" it
imposes are "based upon reasonable conditions ... of a character appropriate to
the public purpose."

Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412.

The preamble to

Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2 notes, in relevant part, that "the Board of
County Commissioners have determined that certain animals pose a risk to the
citizens of Payette County."7 (Appendix A, p.1.) The ordinance further provides
that a wild or exotic animal is "[a]ny animal which is wild, fierce, dangerous,
noxious or naturally inclined to do harm," and specifically includes "tigers" as
animals that meet this definition. Payette County Ordinance § 5-6-2 B.
Korn nevertheless contends the "problem" with the "assertion" that "the
ordinance protects people from dangerous exotic animals" is "that the testimony
at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss indicated that the animals were not

'Similarly, I.C. § 25-3901 provides, "The Idaho legislature finds and declares that
the agriculture industry, wildlife of the state, and the environment are all
important components of Idaho's economy, and that it is in the public interest to
strictly regulate the importation or possession of deleterious exotic animals up to
and including prohibition of the importation of such animals." The Idaho
Department of Agriculture has classified tigers as "deleterious exotic animals."
IDAPA 02.04.27.807.02.
11

dangerous and no evidence was presented by the County to show otherwise."
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The testimony to which Korn presumably refers is his
own testimony that his tigers have been declawed, have never escaped, and
probably would not know how to "look for food" if they escaped. (8/4/06 Tr., p.32,
L.15- p.33, L.1, p.38, Ls.10-25.) Korn's opinion about the danger posed by his
tigers is, however, irrelevant, and he is confused about the state's burden in
relation to establishing a "legitimate public purpose."

It was not the state's

burden to present evidence that tigers in general or Korn's tigers in particular do
not pose a danger.

The Payette County Commissioners, like the Idaho

Department of Agriculture pursuant to the authority granted to them by the state
legislature, found that tigers are dangerous. The state is not required

to rebut

Korn's assertion to the contrary. Korn's appellate claim that "the County failed

to

establish a significant and legitimate interest in enacting the Ordinance"
(Appellant's Brief, p.9), therefore, fails.
Finally, Korn argues that "(e]ven if the County had established a significant
and legitimate interest, the County's actions in enacting the Ordinance affected
the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties in a way that is not based
upon reasonable conditions."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

Korn reasons that

because "the County could have enacted an Ordinance that provided for
guidelines that Korn would have to follow
failure to do so is not reasonable.

to keep the animals in the County," its

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Korn's argument

fails.
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"Unless the State itself is a contracting party, as is customary in reviewing
economic and social regulation, ... courts properly defer to legislative judgment
as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure."

Energy

Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412-13 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the
Payette County Commissioners' judgment, it was reasonable and necessary to
regulate the possession of certain wild or exotic animals within their county. In
formulating the regulation, the commissioners provided an exception for "wild or
exotic" animals that are "domestic to the State of Idaho" for "persons who are
expressly licensed or permitted in writing by the Idaho Department of Fish and
Game to keep and/or rehabilitate any such animal . . .. "
Ordinance § 5-6-2.

Payette County

That the Commissioners could have expanded that

exception to include animals that are not domestic to the State of Idaho, e.g.,
tigers and giraffes, does not make their decision not to unreasonable. Korn has
failed to establish otherwise.
Because Korn failed to establish he had any existing contractual
obligations that were substantially impaired by the enactment of Payette County
Ordinance § 5-6-2, or that if there was substantial impairment, the impairment
was illegitimate and unreasonable, he has failed to establish error in the denial of
his motion to dismiss Count I.

13

II.
Korn Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing The District Court Erred In
Affirming The Magistrate's Decision Denying Korn's Request To Admit
Uncertified Copies Of Two Bankruptcy Orders

A.

Introduction
Korn argues that the magistrate erred in excluding two uncertified

bankruptcy court orders, Exhibits E and F (Appendices B & C), claiming his
testimony was sufficient for purposes of establishing authenticity. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.12-14.) Korn further argues exclusion of the orders was not harmless
because, without the orders, he was "simply unable to make a convincing claim
of necessity when he was not allowed to introduce into evidence the very
documents that were the cause of the claim .... "

(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

Korn's claims fails because the foundation offered in support of Exhibits E and F
was insufficient for purposes of establishing authenticity.

Even if the exhibits

should have been admitted, any error in failing to admit them was harmless.
B.

Standard of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, _ , 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its
judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion.
State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731-32, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001); State v.
Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971,974,829 P.2d 861 (1992).
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C.

Korn Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing Error With Respect
To The Magistrate's Failure To Admit The Uncertified Copies Of Two
Bankruptcy Orders
Rule 901, I.R.E., governs the foundational requirements for documentary

evidence and states, in relevant part:
General provision. The requirement of authentication or
(a)
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims.
Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of
(b)
limitation, the following are examples of authentication or
identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:

(1)
Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony
of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be.
(Emphasis in original.) Rule 1005(a), I.R.E., provides:
Proof of public record. The contents of an official record, or of a
document authorized to be recorded or filed and actually recorded
or filed, including data compilations in any form, if otherwise
admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as correct in
accordance with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness
who has compared it with the original. If a copy which complies
with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, then other evidence of the contents may be
given.

(Emphasis in original.) Rule 902, referred to in I.R.E. 1005(a) states, in relevant
part: "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility
is not required" for certified copies of public records. I.R.E. 902(4).
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Korn if he could "produce any
court order from July or thereabouts of '05 which indicates that you're expressly
to come to Payette County?"

(Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.15-18.)

Korn responded,

"Yes," and the prosecutor again asked if he could "produce it." (Trial Tr., p.155,
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Ls.19-20.) At that point, counsel for Korn presented "the order approving the
sale" and "the order releasing the funds." (Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.23-25.) Korn and
the prosecutor then engaged in an exchange about whether the order releasing
funds merely authorized the release of funds for the purpose of moving the
animals to Payette or whether the order actually required Korn to move to
Payette County. (Trial Tr., p.156, Ls.1-13.) During this exchange, the prosecutor
handed Korn the document to which he was referring, and Korn read the
following excerpt from the document:
Mike Spink is further ordered and directed to promptly and timely
release any and all other DOR funds held in trust for him for
expenses actually incurred or to be incurred in association with the
construction of alternative habitats, transportation assisted with the
removal of the animals from the Nampa property to the relocation of
the Payette, Idaho property.
(Trial Tr., p.157, Ls.4-11.)
The following colloquy then ensued:
Q:
But anywhere does it say that you shall move to Payette
County?

A:

I think that's pretty explicit right there, sir.

Doesn't that just say that he's authorized release of money
for you to build facilities in Payette County? You're not ordered to
do anything there. That order's to Mike Spink.
Q:

A:

Relocation, sir. It says relocation to Payette County.

Q:
Does it say anywhere that you shall move to Payette
County?

A:

I guess it doesn't say that I'm to be -- I'm to move.

Q:

All right. That's my question.

A:

The animals are to be removed.
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Does it say the animals shall be removed to Payette
County?
Q:

A:

Relocation to Payette County.

Q:
That order authorizes the release of funds. It does not say
those animals shall be removed to Payette County. At least I didn't
read that.

A:

Their relocation to Payette County.

Q:

Read the (inaudible) in front of it. Don't just read that piece.

A:

I did.

Q:

Authorize him to release funds.

A:

For the relocation of the animals to Payette County.

Q:
Is it somewhere else where it says shall move to Payette
County?

A:
That's the way -- that's the way I read it is it said the animals
will be relocated to Payette County.
Q:
And that's your justification for corning here and not doing
anything else?

A:
No, sir. The property was purchased in May and -- with the
sole purpose of moving the animals to Payette County. The
purpose of moving to Payette County was to get the animals out of
Nampa and move to Payette County because Payette County didn't
have any ordinances prohibiting it. And so under those conditions,
I was forced to move. I had no other choice.
(Trial Tr., p.157, l.12- p.159, L.2.)
On redirect, counsel for Korn sought to admit both the order releasing
funds, Exhibit F (Appendix B), and the Order Approving and Confirming Sale,
Exhibit E (Appendix C).

With respect to Exhibit F, counsel for Korn laid the

following foundation:
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Q:
Mr. Korn, I'll ask you to take a look at what's been marked
for identification as Defendant's Exhibit F.
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Do you recognize that document?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

What is it?

A:
It's a court order releasing funds for the construction of
animal habitats at Payette.

Q:
Is that a copy of the order the prosecutor handed you on
cross-examination and asked you to read from to the jury?

A:

The one that he handed me had several more pages in it. It
looks the same in the front but it looks like that one had more pages
in it. Maybe I'm mistaken.

Q:

Can I have that?

A:
The one I have is an order releasing funds. That's the one
we were discussing. It's not what you recounted.
Q:

Your Honor, may I approach the witness?

COURT:

You may.

Q:
I'm handing you a copy of what the prosecutor handed you
on his cross-examination.
A:

Yes, sir, it is the same. I'm sorry.

Q:

So Defense F is the same as what the prosecutor gave you?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

The same thing you read from for the jury?

A:

Yes, sir.

(Trial Tr., p.167, L.2-p.168, L.6.)
Foundation for Exhibit E was laid as follows:
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Q:
Go ahead and take a look at what's been marked for
identification as Defense Exhibit E as in echo. Do you see that
document?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Do you recognize that document?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

What is it?

A:
It's a -- it's an order approving and confirming the sale of the
Nampa real estate from the debtor to DDR outside the ordinary
course of business.
Q:

So is that an order issued in your bankruptcy case?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
Does the order deal with the sale of the property and the
removal of the animals?
A:

Yes, sir.

(Trial Tr., p.165, L.23-p.166, L.13.)
When Korn moved to admit both exhibits, the prosecutor objected
because they were not certified copies of the court's order, and the magistrate
sustained the objection. (Trial Tr., p.166, Ls.14-24, p.168, Ls.7-15.) The district
court on appeal concluded Korn's testimony regarding Exhibit E "may have been
enough to authenticate the order under IRE 901," but his testimony regarding
Exhibit F was not. (R., pp.47-48.) The district court further concluded that even
if the magistrate should have admitted Exhibit E, the error was harmless since
"[t]he jury had the benefit of hearing [Korn's] testimony about the contents of the
Exhibit E even though the document was not admitted into evidence." (R., p.48.)
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The district court also noted any error was harmless since the jury "had the
benefit of hearing [Kern's) testimony that he believed the bankruptcy order
required him to move the animals from Canyon County to Payette County," and
the jury was "properly instructed on the defense of necessity." (R., p.48.) The
district court correctly concluded Kern's testimony regarding Exhibit F was
insufficient. Although the district court determined Korn's foundation for Exhibit E
"may have been enough," it too was insufficient.
Because Korn was attempting to admit copies of the "contents of an
official record, or of a document authorized to be recorded or filed," he was
required to comply with I.R.E. 1005, which requires that the document be
"actually recorded or filed," and either "certified as correct in accordance with
Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the
original." I.RE. 1005(a). The foundation offered in support of Exhibits E and F
did not satisfy these requirements. First, neither Exhibit E nor Exhibit F contains
a file stamp, and there was no testimony or evidence that the court orders were
"actually recorded or filed." Second, because Exhibits E and F were not certified
copies, in order to admit them Korn was required to establish he compared them
with the originals and that they were in fact correct copies. Korn did not do so.
Korn has, therefore, failed to establish error in the failure to admit Exhibits E and

F.
Even assuming Korn adequately authenticated Exhibits E and F such that
they should have been admitted, Korn is not entitled to relief because the failure
to admit the exhibits was harmless error. See I.R.E. 103(a) ("Error may not be
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predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected .... "); !.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.") ''The
standard for determining whether error is harmless is 'whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to
the conviction and that the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 488, 873
P.2d 122, 133 (1994) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 762, 810 P.2d
680, 700 (1991 )).
Notwithstanding Korn's assertions to the contrary, neither Exhibit E nor
Exhibit F support his claim that the bankruptcy court ordered him to move his
animals to Payette County.

Rather, Exhibit F, the Order Releasing Funds

(Appendix 8), merely ordered Michael Spinks, counsel for DOR, to release funds
"for expenses actually incurred or to be incurred in association with the
construction of alternate habitats, transportation associated with the removal of
the animals from the Nampa Idaho property and their relocation to the Payette
Idaho property." (Exhibit F, p.2 (Appendix 8) (italics in original).) This order was

dated August 18, 2005 (id. at p.4), more than four months after Korn purchased
the property in Payette and began preparing the property to move his animals
there (Trial Tr., p.128, L.23 - p.130, L.22 (Korn testifies his mother purchased the
property at the end of April, 2005, and "construction started immediately on the
facilities")).

When Korn ran out of money around July 2005, DOR provided

assistance in order to facilitate the move.
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(Trial Tr., p.130, .19 - p.131, L.6,

p.133, L.17 - p.135, L.17.)

It is clear the bankruptcy Order Releasing Funds

merely memorialized the terms of that assistance and referenced the Payette
property because that was where the construction was occurring, not because
the court ordered that it occur there.
Furthermore, although the Order Releasing Funds was not admitted into
evidence, the relevant portions were read into the record and Korn himself
indicated there was no other language in that order, other than the portion he
read, that he interpreted as ordering him to move his animals to Payette. (Trial
Tr., p.156, L.17 - p.158, L.18.) Accordingly, any error in failing to admit that
particular order was harmless.
The failure to admit Exhibit E, the Order Approving and Confirming Sale,
was also harmless because it contained no reference to Payette. The order only
approved the terms of the sale of the Nampa property to DDR and ordered
disbursement of DDR funds

to Korn for purposes of removing "all animals ...

from the Nampa Real Estate," and set forth the terms of any such disbursements.
(Exhibit E, pp.10-11 (Appendix C).) Admission of this exhibit would not have
made Korn's claim of necessity any more "convincing" than his testimony
because the exhibit did not support his contention that the bankruptcy court
ordered him to move his animals to Payette. This Court can, therefore, conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to admit Exhibit E did not contribute to
the verdict, and any error in failing to admit the exhibit was harmless.
Because Korn failed to adequately authenticate Exhibits E or F, the
magistrate did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the exhibits and the
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district court did not err in affirming that decision on appeal. Even if there was
error, the error was harmless.

Korn has, therefore, failed to establish he is

entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's
Decision on Appeal affirming Korn's convictions.
DATED this 1z!h day of January 2009.

Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1z!h day of January 2009, served two
true and correct copies of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing
them in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Kelly Whiting
425 South Whitley Drive, Suite 6
Fruitland, ID 83619

puty Attorney General
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PAYETTE COUNTY ORDINANCE N0.4@5--1/,

:

An ordinance of Payette County, Idaho adding Chapter 6 of Title 5 of the County
Code of Payette County, Idaho and sections of the County Code of Payette County, Idaho.
WHEREAS, the County of Payette is a political subdivision of the State ofldaho and
operating under the laws of the State of Idaho;
WHEREAS, the Board of County Commissioners have determined that certain
animals pose a risk to the citizens of Payette County;
Be it ordained and resolved by the Board of County Commissioners for Payette
County, Idaho:
THAT Chapter 6 of Title 5 of the County Code of Payette County, Idaho is hereby
added entitled "EXOTIC ANIMALS;"
THAT Sections 5-6-1 through and including 6-5-3 of the Payette County Code are
hereby added to regulate the possession of wild or exotic animals;
THAT Section 6-5-1 shall herein read as follows:

DEFINITIONS: WILD OR EXOTIC ANWAL -- Any animal which is wild, fierce,
dangerous, noxious or naturally inclined to do harm. "Wild animals," however domesticated,
shall also include but not be limited to:
A.
Dog family (Canidea): all except domesticated dogs, including wolf, fox, coyote, dingo,
wolf hybrids, etc.
B.
Cat family (Felidea): all except commonly accepted domestic cats, including lions,
pumas, panthers, mountain lions, leopards, jaguars, ocelots, margays, tigers, wild cats, etc.
C.

Bears (Ursidea): all bears, including grizzly bears, brown bears, black bears, etc.

D.
Weasels (Mustelidea): all, including weasels, martens, mink, wolverine, ferrets, badgers,
otters, ermine, mongoose, etc.
E.

Raccoons (Procynniddae): all raccoons and civets.

F.

Porcupine (Erethizontidae): all porcupines.
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G.

Skunks.

H.

Snakes: all venomous and constricting snakes.

I.

Venomous lizards.

J.

Crocodillians: all alligators, caimans, crocodiles, gavials, etc.

K.

Venomous fish and piranha.

L.

Venomous invertebrates.

THAT Section 6-5-2 shall herein read as follows:
PROHIBITED ACTS: It shall be unlawful for any person, corporate or entity to harbor,
keep, maintain or possess within the County of Payette any wild or exotic animal,except
those persons who are expressly licensed or permitted in writing by the Idaho Department of
Fish and Game to keep and/or rehabilitate any such animal so long as that person or persons
are in compliance with the terms of such a license and the animal kept or rehabilitated is
domestic to the State of Idaho.
THAT Section 6-5-3 shall herein read as follows:
PENALTIES: A person, firm, corporation or entity violating any of the provisions of this
Chapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined
in an amount not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300.00) or be imprisoned in the County
jail for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or be both so fined and imprisoned.

~ri.
Dated this ~day of May, 2005.
Board of County Commissioners, for

Pg&ili-o..,.,____
ATTEST:
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Rodney T. Buttars

BUTTARS LAW OFFICE, CHTD.
380 S. 4th Street,. Suite 202
P.O. Box 190166
Boise, Idaho 83719
Telephone:
(208) 345-3777
Facsimile:
(208) 345-4344
Attorney for Debtor-In-Possession
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Case No. 04-04261

In re

ORDER RELEASING FUNDS

JERRY KORN,
Debtor-In-Possession,

THE MATIER of MOTION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RELEASE OF FUNDS HELD FOR
REMOVAL OF ANIMALS, AND FROM TRUST FUNDS RECEIVED IN CONNECTION WITH THE
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE (The Motion), filed by Debtor-in-Possession herein,
having come before the court for hearing this 18th day of August, 2005 and; the Debtor-in-Possession
appearing in person with his attorney of record, Rodney T. Buttars and; Gary McGlendon appearing
on behalfofthe Office of the U.S. Trustee and; Randall Peterman appearing on behalf of the Special
Custodian Mark Clark and; Gary Morgan appearing on behalfofCreditor, Susan Korn and; Michael
Spink and David Neumann appearing on behalf ofDDR, the Court, having heard oral argument and
considering the matter fully and being duly advised in the premise, finds as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
l.

Michael Spink is hereby authorized to immediately release to Debtor-in-Possession,

the sum of $13,131.00 as reimbursement for expenses already expended by Debtor-in-Possession
as evidenced by "The Motion" and attached exhibits as referenced hereinabove.
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2.

Michael Spink is further ordered and directed to promptly and timely release any and

all other DDR funds held in trust by him for expenses actually incurred or to be incurred in
association with the construction of alternate habitats, transportation associated with the removal of
the animals from the Nampa Idaho property and their relocation to the Payette Idaho property under
the following conditions:
A.

That the Debtor-in-Possession shall submit copies of any and all invoices,

purchase orders, bills, and or expense vouchers associated with the above and
foregoing acts or events to Mr. Spink, accompanied by the declaration of the Debtorin-Possession that the expenses reflected in such documents represent I) reasonable
and necessary expenses incurred or to be incurred for the purposes outlined above, 2)
that the Debtor-in-Possession's declaration shall also contain a description of the
names and identities of the persons and or parties performing such labor and or
providing such material and or services, along with their name address and tax
identification or social security number, 3) a description ofthe purpose and intent for
which the work was performed or is to be performed, and 4) identify which phase of
the animal removal process such work or materials was performed or is to be
performed in relation thereto.
B.

That upon receipt of such information, Mr. Spink shall then be authorized to

promptly release sufficient trust funds in payment thereof, by tendering such funds
either directly to the third party vendor, to the Debtor-in-Possession or to Debtor-inPossession's legal counsel for final disbursement to the indicated third parties or, for
reimbursement of out of pocket expenses already expended by the Debtor-inPossession.
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C. In the event such expense documents reflect expenses incurred directly associated
with the physical transportation of any of the animals from the Nampa Idaho
property to the Payette Idaho property, Debtor-in-Possession's declaration shall also
contain a description of such animals, the number thereof, the bread and or name
associated with the relocation of such animals.
3.

That in addition, a copy of said expense documents and declarations shall also be

provided to Mr. Gary Morgan, attorney for Creditor, Susan Korn.
4. That upon receipt of such funds the Debtor-in-Possession his legal counsel shall promptly
tender payment to any such vendors and or laborers indicated by said billing documents.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: DDR, its authorized
representatives, and or Gary Morgan, attorney for Susan Korn, shall be entitled to open access to
the Payette Idaho property and any financial accounting records pertaining to the utilization of the
DOR funds for the sole purpose of observing, inspecting and or monitoring the progress of the
animal relocation with reasonable advance notice to Debtor-in-Possession's attorney of record,
Rodney T. Buttars.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: this order is issued in
compliance with paragraph 9 (c) of this Court's Order dated June 23, 2005 entitled "Order

Approving and Confirming the Sale ofthe Nampa Real Estate from the Debtor to DDR Outside the
. Ordinary Course ofBusiness" ( "Sales Order"). This Order is further intended to modify, alter and
or amend paragraph 21 of the "Real Estate Sales and Purchase Agreement" ("Purchase

Agreement), and to the extent that the above and foregoing authorized disbursements and approved
disbursement procedure differ from , or is in any way are in conflict with any of the provisions of said
"Sales Order" and or "Sales Agreement" the language of this Order shall prevail. Other than the
specific modification contained herein, the language of the "Sales Order" shall prevail.
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DATED: August 18, 2005

~

TERRY L. MYERS
CI-IlEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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APPENDIXC

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRJCT OF IDAHO
In Re:
Case No. 04-0426!-TLM
Chapter 11

JERRY L. KORN,
Debtor.

ORDER APPROVING AND
CONFIRMING THE SALE OF THE
NAMPA REAL ESTATE FROM THE
DEBTOR TO DOR OUTSIDE OF THE
ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS

This matter came before the Court upon:
(a) The Custodian's Motion to Sell Real Property; Motion to
Distribute Proceeds of Sale; and Motion for Related Relief
("Custodian's Motion to Sell") filed by Mark Clark ("Custodian"),
(i) the custodian appointed by the state court in the case of Korn v.
Korn, Case No. CV-2003-7008*C, filed in the Third Judicial
District for the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon
("State Court Proceeding"), and (ii) the custodian whose
appointment continues in this bankruptcy proceeding under 11
U.S.C. Section 543(d) and consensual orders of this Court entered
on March 7, 2005 (Order Regarding Section 543 Motion, Motion
to Dismiss, Motion to Abstain, and Related Issues-"First Order")
and April 21, 2005 (Order Regarding Motions to Sell and Related
!ssues-"Second Order");
(b) The Debtor-in-Possession's Motion to Sell Property Not in the
Ordinary Course of Business ("Debtor's Motion to Sell"), filed by
Jerry Korn ("Debtor"); both as modified by the terms of the
Second Order, and specifically as modified by the Sales
Methodology reflected and defined in the Second Order, entered
by this Court on April 25, 2005;
and
(c) the Objection to Paragraph No. 21 of Agreement for Purchase
and Sale of Real Property ("Ex-Wife Sales Objection") filed
June 8, 2005 by Susan Korn ("Ex-Wife").
Findings:

A.

This Court having determined and found that the property located in

Nampa, Idaho, and more specifically identified on Exhibits A and A-1 attached hereto (the

ORDER APPROVING AND CONFIRMING THE SALE
OF THE NAMPA REAL ESTATE FROM THE DEBTOR
TO DDR OUTSIDE OF THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS - 1

BO!_MTZ:583812,3

"Nampa Real Estate") and as described in a survey to be obtained prior to closing, is subject to
the terms of this Order;
B.

This Court having determined and found (a) that due and adequate notice

of the Custodian's Motion to Sell, the Debtor's Motion to Sell, the Second Order and the Sales
Methodology has been given to each and every necessary party required to be given notice,
including but not limited to all holders of liens, claims, encumbrances and interests against the
Nampa Real Estate, all relevant governmental units, the United States Trustee, all counsel that
have appeared, and all other parties; (b) that due and adequate notice of the Custodian's Motion
to Sell, the Debtor's Motion to Sell, the Second Order and the Sales Methodology has been given
to each and every party required to be given notice by the Second Order; (c) that due and
adequate notice of the Custodian's Motion to Sell, the Debtor's Motion to Sell, the Second Order
and the Sales Methodology has been served upon relevant real estate developers or real estate
brokers or agents in the area of Boise, Idaho and Nampa, Idaho; (d) that due and adequate notice
of the Custodian's Motion to Sell, the Debtor's Motion to Sell, the Second Order and the Sales
Methodology has been served upon relevant zoos and zoological societies; and (e) that a copy of
the Second Order has been published in the Idaho Press Tribune and the Idaho Business Review
at least twice before June 15, 2005, as required by the Second Order;
C.

This Court having determined and found that no further notice or hearing

is necessary in this matter as to any party, including but not limited to Joseph Wakefield
("Wakefield");
D.

This Court having determined and found that, because of the diligent

effort by the Custodian in providing notice to interested parties, sufficient opportunity has been
given for any party in interest to make a higher and better offer for the purchase of the Nampa
Real Estate from the Debtor;
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E.

This Court having determined and found that the Custodian has acted and

is acting within the rights and responsibilities granted to the Custodian in (a) the First Order; and
(b) the Second Order;
F.

This Court having determined and found that the Custodian has complied

in full with the Second Order and the Sales Methodology reflected and defined in the Second
Order as to all parties, including but not limited to Joseph Wakefield;
G.

This Court having determined and found that the Custodian has complied

in full with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. Section 363, Bankruptcy Rule 2002, Bankruptcy Rule
6004 and Local Rule 2002.1, as to all parties, including but not limited to Joseph Wakefield;
H.

This Court having determined and found that the Custodian's

Recommendation Regarding Sale of the Nampa Real Estate, as modified by the Supplement to
Recommendation (collectively "Recommendation") filed by the Custodian with the Court on
June 3, 2005, and_ June 10, 2005, have been timely and properly filed by the Custodian;
I.

This Court having determined and found that the Debtor, the Ex-Wife, the

Custodian, and DDR Nampa, LLC, a subsidiary of Developers Diversified Realty Corp.
("DDR") have entered into and executed a valid and binding Contract of Purchase and Sale of
Real Property ("Sales Contract") among themselves, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B,
whereby the Nampa Real Estate is sold under the terms of this Order;

J.

This Court having determined and found that the Debtor, the Custodian,

the Ex-Wife and DDR all signed such Sales Contract in open Court on June 15, 2005, subject
only to the entry of this Order, and after those parties' consent to the tem1s and conditions of this
Order;
K.

This Court having determined and found that the DDR offer is the highest

and best offer for the Nampa Real Estate, as required by the Sales Methodology;
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L.

This Court having determined and found that at the hearing on June 15,

2005, that no higher offers were received for the purchase of the Nampa Real Estate;
M.

This court having determined and found that the Ex-Wife's Sales

Objection was withdrawn by the Ex-Wife at the hearing on June 15, 2005;
N.

This Court having determined and found that due and sufficient grounds

exist for a sale of the Nampa Real Estate under 11 U.S.C. Section 363(f) and (h) free and clear of
liens, claims, encumbrances and interests, all as set forth below;
0.

This Court having determined and found that the sale of the Nampa Real

Estate free and clear of liens, claims, encumbrances and interests, including the extinguishment
·of all liens claims, encumbrances, and interests, including non-public encumbrances and claims
other than (a) Exceptions 4-5 and 12-20 referenced in paragraph 7 below; and (b) the proration
of2005 taxes and irrigation taxes or assessments, is in the best interests of the Debtor, the estate
and parties in interest;
P.

This Court having determined and found that the Custodian has articulated

a sound business justification and business judgment for the sale of the Nampa Real Estate free
and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and interests;
Q.

This Court having determined and found that the Custodian, DDR, the

Debtor and the Ex-Wife and their respective representatives, attorneys, and advisors have acted
in good faith in all respects relating to the sale of the Nampa Real Estate and such was negotiated
and consented to and entered into by such parties in good faith and from an anus-length
bargaining position; and that DDR is not an insider of the Custodian, the Debtor or the Ex-Wife,
as insider is defined in l I U.S.C. Section 101 (31 ); and DDR as the purchaser is entitled to the
protections afforded under 11 U.S.C. Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code;
R.

This Court having determined and found that the Custodian, the Debtor

and the Ex-Wife and their respective representatives, attorneys and advisors have not colluded
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with DDR in any manner whatsoever and have not violated the provisions of 11 U.S.C.
Section 363(n);
S.

This Court having determined and found that due and sufficient factual

and legal cause exists for entry of this Order;
T.

This Court having considered those matters, documents, evidence and

testimony raised by the parties at the hearing held on June 15, 2005, before this Court, and this
Court having overruled any objections to entry of this Order;
U.

This Court having determined and found, after considering the testimony

of Wakefield and Exhibits land 2 admitted at the hearing on June 15, 2005, and after
considering the arguments of counsel, (a) that the lien, claim, encumbrance or interest of
Wakefield, as represented by Exhibit l admitted by this Court (which is a Quit Claim Deed
("Quit Claim Deed") dated May 2, 2002, and recorded with the Canyon County Recorder by
Wakefield on May 23, 2005, as Instrument No. 200528273), represents an equitable mortgage on
the Nampa Real Estate, and does not represent an ownership interest in the Nampa Real Estate,
and does not constitute a cloud on the title as to the Nampa Real Estate; (b) that the sale of the
Nampa Real Estate under this Sales Order shall occur free and clear of the lien, claim,
encumbrance and interest of Wakefield; (c) that the lien, claim, encumbrance and interest of
Wakefield as represented by the Quit Claim Deed can be adequately protected in this matter, by
means of the Court ordering that such lien, claim, encumbrance and interest attach to the cash
proceeds from the sale of the Nampa Real Estate, but only to the same validity, priority and
extent as such lien, claim, encumbrance and interest attached to the Nampa Real Estate; (d) that
the recordation of the Quit Claim Deed by Wakefield as identified above was in violation of the
automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 362, and therefore void ab initio as a matter oflaw; and (e)
that except as set forth in this Sales Order, questions or issues regarding the validity, priority and
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extent of the Wakefield Quit Claim Deed are hereby reserved for further proceedings before this
Court;
V.

This Court having determined and found that any excess proceeds from

the sale of the Nampa Real Estate, after payment of all sums allowed under this Order or under
the terms of the Omnibus Order identified below should be deposited in the registry of this
Court;
W.

This Court having determined and found that the $50,000 payment

referenced in Paragraph 21 of the Sales Contract from DDR to the Debtor shall be deposited into
the trust account of an independent party, subject to such terms and conditions as are set forth in
this Order below, and that the provisions of Paragraph 2 l of the Sales Contract shall be altered
accordingly;
X.

This Court having determined and found that it is in the best interests of

the Custodian, the estate, the Debtor and the Ex-Wife that this Court reserve any and all rights or
duties or obligations which one may have or hold against the other all as set forth below;
Y.

This Court having entered an Omnibus Order Regarding Matters Raised at

the Hearing on June 15, 2005, ("Omnibus Order") which sets forth the Court's ruling regarding
all matters raised at the hearing on June 15, 2005, including the Amended Report of the
Custodian Regarding Secured Claims and Payment Thereof, filed by the Custodian, and other
than those matters identified above;

Now therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
l.

Each of the findings set forth above is supported by the record before the

2.

The interests of(a) the Custodian, (b) the Debtor (whether such interest

Court.

represents the Debtor's interest as a debtor in possession or otherwise, and whether such interest
represents an ownership interest), and (c) the Ex-Wife (whether such interests represents a
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creditor's interest or otherwise, and whether such interest represents an ownership interest) in the
Nampa Real Estate are all subject to the terms of this Order.
3.

The Custodian's Motion to Sell, as modified by this Couit's Second

Order, is hereby granted as to the Nampa Real Estate identified on Exhibits A and A-1, and as
described in a survey to be obtained prior to closing.
4.

The Sales Contract, in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B, is hereby

approved in its entirety, subject only to the terms of this Sales Order.
5.

The Debtor's Motion to Sell, the Ex-Wife's Sales Objection, and any other

objections to the Custodian's Motion to Sell, are hereby denied.
6.

The Custodian, the Debtor, and the Ex-Wife are hereby authorized,

directed and ordered to take any action that may reasonably be requested of any them for the
purposes of assigning, transferring, conveying, and delivering to DDR, or reducing to
possession, any or all of the Nampa Real Estate and to execute : (i) the Sales Contract, the deed
of sale, and similar documents; (ii) amendments to the Sales Contract and related agreements as
may be required; and (iii) other documents consistent with this Order as the Custodian and DDR
deem necessary or desirable to effectuate the sale of the Nampa Real Estate and the
consummation of the Sales Contract. In the event of non-compliance by the Custodian, the
Debtor, or the Ex-Wife as to any of the requirements of this paragraph 6, DDR or any other party
in interest may immediately file a motion with this Court requiring such compliance.
7.

Except as set forth in this Order, and pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 363(b)

and Section 363(f)(l), (2) (3) (4) and (5), and Section 363(h), the Nampa Real Estate shall be
sold, conveyed, granted, assigned, transferred, and delivered to DDR pursuant to the terms of the
Sales Contract:
(a)

free and clear of any and all liens, claims, encumbrances and interests of

any and all parties, all of which shall be extinguished by such sale;
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(b)

free and clear of any lien, claim, encumbrance or interest of Wakefield,

whether represented by the Quit Claim Deed or otherwise, all of which shall be
extinguished by such sale; and
(c)

free and clear of any lien, claim, encumbrance or interest represented by

or constituting a non-public lien, claim, encumbrance, or interest;
other than

(a)

those Exceptions identified in the Commitment for Title Insurance from

First American Title Insurance Company, Commitment No. PN82162, dated
October 21, 2004, and addressed to Mark Clark, Exceptions 4-5 and 12-20, all as
reflected on Exhibit C attached hereto; and
(b)

prorated 2005 taxes and irrigation assessments, both of which shall be

prorated as of the date of the closing of the sale of the Nampa Real Estate.
(c)

As to Exceptions 6 and 11 in the Commitment for Title Insurance from

First American Title Company. Commitment No. PN82162. dated October 21,
2004, and addressed to Mark Clark. referenced above in subparagraph (a). it is
hereby ordered that (a) those matters referenced in such Exceptions 6 and 11 shall
not form the basis for a claim or cause of action in favor ofDDR and against the
Custodian; and (b) any such claim or cause of action is hereby ordered and
deemed to be waived by DDR.
Any and all other liens. claims, encumbrances and interests, including but not
limited to the liens, claims, encumbrances and interests of the Debtor and Ex-Wife, shall attach
to the proceeds of the sale of the Nampa Real Estate, and maintain the same validity, priority and
extent as such liens, claims, encumbrances and interests had with respect to the Nampa Real
Estate.

ORDER APPROVING AND CONFIRMING THE SALE
OF THE NAMPA REAL ESTATE FROM THE DEBTOR
TO DDR OUTSIDE OF THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS - 8

BOl_MT2:5838123

Any lien, claim, encumbrance or interest of Wakefield, whether represented by
the Quit Claim Deed or otherwise, represents an equitable mortgage on the Nampa Real Estate,
and does not represent an ownership interest in the Nampa Real Estate and does not constitute a
cloud on title as to the Nampa Real Estate. The Sale of the Nampa Real Estate shall occur free
and clear of the lien, claim, encumbrance and interest of Wakefield, whose lien, claim,
encumbrance or interest shall attach to the cash proceeds from the sale of the Nampa Real Estate,
but only to the same validity, priority and extent as such lien, claim, encumbrance and interest
attached to the Nampa Real Estate. The Court hereby orders and acknowledges that Wakefield's
recordation of Quit Claim Deed was in violation of the automatic stay of 11 U,S.C. Section 362,
and therefore void ab initio as a matter of law, and that except as set forth in this Sales Order,
questions or issues regarding the validity, priority and extent of the Wakefield Quit Claim Deed
are hereby reserved for further proceedings before this Court.
8.

Except as set forth in this Order, and except as set forth in the Omnibus

Order filed simultaneous with the Order, the proceeds of the sale of the Nampa Real Estate shall
be paid into the registry of the Comt, subject to the further order of this Court. Pursuant to Rules
7067.1 and 7067.2 of the Local Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, it is hereby ordered as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that the clerk deposit the amount identified above into the
registry of the Court in an automatically renewable treasury bill or passbook
account or similar account, in the name of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, at a bank
of the clerk's choosing, said funds to remain invested pending further order of the
Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk shall be authorized to deduct a fee
from the income earned on the investment equal to 10 percent of the income
earned while the funds are held in the court's registry fund, regardless of the
nature of the case underlying the investment and without further order of the
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court. The interest payable to the U.S. Courts shall be paid prior to any other
distribution of the account. Investments having a maturity date will be assessed a
fee at the time the investment instrument matures.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel presenting this order personally serve a
copy thereof on the clerk or on his financial deputy. Absent the aforesaid service,
the clerk is hereby relieved of any personal liability relative to compliance with
this order.
9.

Paragraph 21 of the Sales Contract contains provisions regarding the

payment of $50,000 ("DDR Funds") from DDR to the Debtor, the purpose of which is to remove
all animals ("Animals") from the Nampa Rea! Estate. The terms and conditions reflected in
Paragraph 21 of the Sales Contract are hereby amended as follows:
(a)

The DDR Funds shall be deposited to the trust account ("Trust Account")
of Mike Spink, local counsel for DDR;

(b)

The DDR Funds shall be disbursed from the Trust Account upon the
written request of the Debtor, subject to the following terms and
conditions: (i) disbursements shall be made from the Trust Account only
as to expenses actually incurred in removing the Animals from the Nampa
Real Estate; (ii) disbursements shall be made from the Trust Account only
when supported by the Debtor's submission to Mike Spink of a written
statement of the dollar amount of the expense, and the identity of the party
to whom the expense is paid and to whom the disbursal should be made;
(iii) disbursements shall be made from the Trust Account only when
supporting documents or invoices are provided by the Debtor to
substantiate the expense, justifying such expense; and (iv) disbursements
shall be made from the Trust Account only after the Debtor provides such
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supporting documents as well as a description of the animal transferred,
the new location of the animal, and the name and address of the party in
possession or owner of the animal.
(c)

The DDR Funds shall be disbursed from the Trust Account only upon
entry of an order of this Court, allowing such disbursal. Such order may
be obtained either (a) through the filing of separate motions as to separate
disbursements to be heard by the Court; or (b) through submission to the
Court of a proposed order, approved by the Custodian, the Debtor, the ExWife and DDR, proposing a process for disbursal to which all such parties
consent.

(d)

Any excess proceeds of the DDR Funds shall deposited to the registry of
the Court, as set forth in Paragraph 8 above.

10.

This Court specifically orders and reserves to both the Debtor and the Ex-

Wife any right which either Debtor or Ex-Wife may have or hold regarding:
(a)

the nature and ownership and priority interest of each such party in (i) the
DDR Funds, or (ii) the excess proceeds of sale from the sale of the Nampa
Real Estate; or (iii) any other property of the estate;

(b)

the liability of each such party for any indebtedness which may be owed to
any creditor of the Debtor and the Ex-Wife, whether or not represented in
this bankruptcy; or

(c)

who, between the Debtor and Ex-Wife, may be liable or responsible for
payment of any amounts payable by one to the other under the divorce
decree or otherwise.

11.

This Court further defers and reserves any decision as to whether the

determination of such issues shall be made by this Court or in the case of Korn v. Korn, Case No.
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CV-2003-7008*C, filed in the Third Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and for the County
of Canyon.
12.

DDR is hereby granted and is entitled to the protections provided to a

good-faith purchaser under 11 U.S.C. Section 363(m). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 363(m),
the reversal or modification of this Order on appeal will not affect the validity of the transfer of
the Nampa Real Estate to DDR as well as the transactions contemplated and/or authorized by
this Order, unless the same is stayed pending appeal prior to the closing of the transactions
authorized herein.
13.

This is a final order and enforceable upon entry. No just reasons exist for

delay in the implementation of this Order. This Order is a final and appealable order pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rules 7054(a) and 9014 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The ten (10)
day stay set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 6004(g) is hereby deemed waived.
14.

This Court shall retain jurisdiction to (a) implement and enforce the tem1s

and provisions of this Order and the Sales Contract; (b) any disputes relating thereto or with
respect to the Sales Contract; and (c) determine any disputes regarding the transfer of the Nampa
Real Estate or the closing of the Nampa Real Estate.
15.

This Order survives any dismissal or conversion of this case,

notwithstanding the provisions of 11 U.S.C. Section 348 and Section 349.
16.

This Order is binding upon the Custodian, the Debtor, the Ex-Wife, DDR,

and any and all parties in interest, including but not limited to any successor trustee in
bankruptcy.
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT

isl
Gary Mcclendon, U.S. Trustee
DATED: June 20, 2005
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Isl
Loren Ipsen
DATED: June 20, 2005

Isl

Rodney Buttars
DATED: June 20, 2005

Isl

Gary Morgan
DATED: June 20, 2005

Isl

Judy Geier
DATED: June 20, 2005

Isl
Scott Spears
DATED: June 20, 2005

Isl
David Neumann
DATED: June 20, 2005

Isl

Mark Clark
DATED: June 20, 2005
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is/

Randall A. Peterman
DATED: June 20, 2005
##########

DATED: June 23, 2005

~E
CHIEFU. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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AGREEMENTFORPURCHASEANDSALE
OF REAL PROPERTY
THIS AGREEMENT ("Agreement") made as of the Effective Date (hereinafter
defined) by and between DDR NAMPA LLC ("Buyer"); and MARK CLARK,
SPECIAL MASTER AND CUSTODIAN ("Custodian"), JERRY KORN AND
SUSAN KORN (collectively, the "Korns") (Custodian and the Korns are hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Seller").
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Jerry Kom has commenced a reorganization case under Chapter 11
of Title 11 (the "Bankruptcy Code") of the United States Code, which case is being
administered under Case No. 04-04261 (the "Estate") pending in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of!daho (the "Bankruptcy Court"). Approval of the
Transaction (hereinafter defined) by the Bankruptcy Court and tlie sale of the Property
(hereinafter defined) to Buyer is to be sought pursuant to Sections 363(b), (f), (h) and (m)
of the Bankruptcy Code. This Agreement and the Transaction are subject to the approval
of the Bankruptcy Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE MUTUAL
PROMISES SET FORTH HEREIN AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION, THE RECEIPT AND SUFFlCIENCY OF WHICH ARE HEREBY
ACKNOWLEDGED, THE PARTIES HERETO AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

Definitions
Section 1. Terms. The terms listed below shall have the respective meanings
given them as set forth adjacent each term.
(a)
"Broker(s)" shall mean: Jerry Van Engen, Thornton Oliver Keller,
Commercial Real Estate.
(b)

"Closing" shall occur on or before July 15, 2005.

(c)
"Earnest Money" shall mean Four Hundred Fifty Thousand and 00/100
Dollars ($450,000.00). The Earnest Money has been deposited in escrow with the
Escrow Agent (hereinafter defined), and shall be applied as part payment of the
Purchase Price (hereinafter defmed) for the Property at the time sale is closed, or
otherwise disbursed as expressly provided in this Agreement.
(d)
"Property" shall mean that parcel or real property located in Canyon
County, Idaho, as more particularly described: (i) on Exhibit A attached hereto
and incorporated herein by reference, together with all buildings and
improvements thereon and all fixtures and appurtenances thereto; and, {ii) in a
legal description of the Property to be determined by a survey performed at
Buyer's expense, which description shall be agreed to by the parties and attached
hereto as Exhibit B. Survey to be completed no later than 30 days after the

Effective Dat.e of this Agreement.

"Purchase Price" shall mean the amount of One Million Seven Hundred
(e)
Thousand Dollars ($1,700,000.00), payable to Escrow Agent by official bank
check, wire transfer or other immediat.ely available funds at Closing upon
completion of the update of title to fhe Property and recordation of the Deed
thereto from Seller.
(f)
"Seller's Notice Address" shall be as follows, except as same may be
changed pursuant to Section l 0:

Mark Clark
Special Master and Custodian
719 1'1 Street South
P.O. Box 846
Nampa, Idaho 83653-0846
Phone: (208) 463-8903
Fax: (208) 463-9776

"Buyer's Notice Address" shall be as follows, except as same may be
(g)
changed pursuant to Section I 0:
DDR Nampa LLC
c/o Developers Diversified Realty Corporation
3300 Enterprise Parkway
Beachwood, Ohio 44122
Attn: Tim Bruce
Phone: (216) 755-5855
Fax: (216) 755-1855
With a copy to:
Jeffrey J. Wild, Esq.
Benesch Friedlander Coplan & AronoffLLP
2300 BP Tower, 200 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
Phone: (216) 363-4544
Fax: (216) 363-4588
(h)
defined).

"Effective Date" shall mean the date of the Sale Order (hereinafter

"Escrow Agent" shall mean Pioneer Title and Escrow of Canyon County
("The Title Company").

(i)

Section 2.

Proration of Expenses: Payment of Costs. Seller and Buyer agree

that all real property taxes shall be prorated on a calendar year basis as of the Closing
Date; provided, however, Seller shall pay on or before Closing all due, delinquent and
roll-back or deferred taxes applicable to the Property for any year prior to the year of
Closing. Buyer shall pay all deed stamps and other conveyance fees or taxes, recording
costs, costs of any title search, title insurance premimns and survey costs. Each party
shall be responsible for their own attorneys' fees. Any charges by the Escrow Agent for
acting a~ Escrow Agent hereunder shall be borne by Buyer.
Section 3. Sale of Property. Seller agrees to sell, and Buyer agrees to buy, the
Property for the Purchase Price set forth above subject to the terms and conditions set
forth in this Agreement (the "Transaction").
Section 4. Payment of Purchase Price. Buyer shall pay the Purchase Price in
accordance with all the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
Section 5. Title. The Korns agree to convey title to the Property by quit claim
deed, subject only to the exceptions hereinafter described. The Korns represent and
warrant that the Korns are the fee simple owners of the Property, and at Closing Seller
shall deliver to Buyer exclusive possession (subject to Section 21 of this Agreement) and
good and marketable fee simple title to said Property, free and clear of all parties in
possession, liens, interests, claims, encumbrances and the like, including tax and other
statutory liens, pursuant to and as evidenced by an order, in form and substance
satisfactory to Buyer, to be entered by the Bankmptcy Court approving the Transaction
pursuant to Sections 363(b), (f), (h) and (m) of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Sale Order");
provided, however, that Buyer shall take title subject to the easements described in the
Sale Procedure Order entered by the Bankruptcy Court on April 25, 2005. Seller agrees
not to transfer the Property or grant any easements or otherwise encumber the Property
from and after the Effective Date of this Agreement.
Section 6. Release of Claims. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
Agreement (except Section 21 ), notwithstanding any statute, rule, regulation or common
law ruling, and except for any and all Claims (hereinafter defined) against Jerry Korn and
the Estate arising from or in connection with the Animal Removal (hereinafter defined),
as of Closing Buyer hereby waives and releases any rights, claims (including, but not
limited to, claims for contribution), causes of action or similar proceedings ("Claims")
Buyer has or may have in connection with events, actions, omissions or activities arising
or occurring before the Closing against the Korns, the Estate, the Custodia.'1, Dairy
Health, Inc. ("Dairy Health") and For the Birds, Inc. ("For the Birds"). As used herein,
"Hazardous Materials" shall mean hazardous or toxic material, waste or substances which
are defined as those substances, material, and wastes, including but not limited to, those
substances, materials and wastes regulated by or listed in environmental laws or by the
Environmental Protection Agency as hazardous substances (40 CFR Part 302) and any
amendrnenrn thereto, or such substances, materials and wastes which are or become
regulated under any applicable local, state or federal law, including, without limitation,
any material, waste or substance which is (i) petroleum or petroleum by-products, (ii)
asbestos or asbestos containing materials, (iii) polycblorinated biphenyls, (iv) designated
as a "hazardous substance" pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1251, et.

seq., (v) defined as a "hazardous waste" pursuant to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6901, et seq. or (vi) defined as a "hazardous substance"
pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601, et. seq. ("CERCLA") (collectively, "Hazardous Materials").
As of the Closing, Seller and the Estate assign to Buyer and its successors and assigns all
of Seller's and fue Estate's rights to any Claims against third parties (except Dairy Fann
and For the Birds, such Claims having been waived and released as provided for herein).
Seller, on behalf of itself and all prior owners and occupants of fue Property, hereby
waives and releases Buyer from any Claims for recovery of costs associated with the
conduct of any voluntary cleanup action or other remedial responses, corrective action or
closure under any applicable federal, state or local environmental laws, including
CERCLA in connection with the Property. The provisions of this Section 6 shall survive
the Closing of fue Transaction and the filing of record of the quit claim deed.

Section 7.

Risk of Loss; Damage; Repair; Condemnatiolll. Until the Closing,

the risk of loss or damage to the Property, except as otherwise provided herein, shall be
borne by Seller. In the event the Property is damaged so that the Property cannot be

conveyed in substantially the same condition as it was prior to Closing, Buyer may elect
to terminate this Agreement and the Earnest Money shall be returned to the Buyer.
Except as to maintaining the Property in its same condition, Seller shall have no
responsibility for the repair of the Property, including any improvements, unless the
parties hereto agree in writing. If Seller obtains knowledge of any condemnation
proceedings affecting the Property, Seller shall immediately notify Buyer of such
proceedings. If, prior to Closing, all or any portion of the Property is taken by
condemnation, or if condemnation proceedings are commenced or threatened, Buyer may,
by written notice to Seller, either (i) terminate this Agreement and receive an immediate
return of the Earnest Money or (ii) proceed forward with the Agreement whereupon
Buyer shall be entitled to at Buyer's election (a) all compensation on account of the
condemnation or (b) have portion of the Property taken or to be taken removed from this
Agreement, and the Purchase Price reduced based upon the remaining acreage contained
in fue portion of the Property taken or to be taken, in which case, the Seller shall be
entitled to all compensation on account of fue taking.
Section 8. Default; Remedies. In the event that the terms and conditions of
this Agreement have been satisfied and Buyer refuses or is unable to settle on this
Agreement within the time limits herein set forth, Seller, as Seller's sole and exclusive
remedy shall be entitled to declare this Agreement cancelled and the Earn.est Money shall
be forfeited to Seller as full liquidated damages, and the parties hereto shall have no
further rights, obligations or liabilities wifu respect to each other hereunder. In the event
that Seller is unable to deliver or comply with any item herein required of Seller at
Closing or to otherwise be perfonned pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, Buyer
shall have the right and option to: (i) terminate this Agreement upon written notice to
Seller and receive a full refund of the Earnest Money; or (ii) demand and compel by legal
proceedings (including specific perfonnance) compliance of the tenns of this Agreement,
including, without limitation, the immediate conveyance of the Property by the Korns.
Seller consents to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court to enforce the terms of this
Agreement after Closing, including, but not limited to, the Animal Removal, the

Disposal, any claims of the Buyer against the Korns and the Estate and the surrender of
possession of the Property.
Section 9. Closing. The Closing shall consist of the execution and delivery by
the Korns to Buyer of a quit claim deed and other documents customarily executed by a
seller in similar transactions, including without !imitation, an owner's affidavit, lien
waiver forms and a non-foreign affidavit, and the payment by Buyer to Seller of the
Purchase Price in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. At Closing, the Earnest
Money shall be applied as part of the Purchase Price. The Closing shall be held at the
office of Buyer's attorney or such other place as the parties hereto may mutually agree.
Section 10. Notices. Any notices or other communications to Buyer or Seller
contemplated by this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be effective upon receipt. In
the case of a notice delivered by (i) pre-paid personal delivery; (ii) pre-paid messenger,
pre-paid express or air courier or similar courier, or (iii) United States first class certified
or registered mail, postage pre-paid, return receipt requested, addressed Buyer or Seller as
provided below, the notice shall be deemed received on the delivery date indicated by the
United States Postal Service or courier service on the return receipt or on the date such
delivery is refused or marked "undeliverable," or if the party is served personally, on the
date of personal delivery. In the case of a notice delivered by facsimile, the notice shall
be deemed received on the date such facsimile is sent, provided that a copy of such notice
is sent the same day by any of the methods in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) oftbe preceding
sentence. Notices shall be delivered to the addresses set out in Section l(f) as to Seller
and in Section l(g) as to Buyer, or at such other addresses as specified by written notice
delivered in accordance herewith.
Section 11. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the sole and entire
agreement among the parties hereto and no modification of this Agreement shall be
binding unless in writing and signed by all parties hereto.
Section 12. Assignment. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of
Seller and Buyer and their respective heirs, executors, legal representatives, successors
and assigns.
Section 13.

[Intentionally Left Blank)

Section 14. Further Assnrances. Seller shall upon Buyer's reasonable
request, and without further consideration, execute, acknowledge and deliver to Buyer
such other documents and instruments, and take such other action as Buyer may
reasonably request or as may be necessary to more effectively transfer to Buyer the
Property described herein in accordance with this Agreement.
Section 15. Applicable Law. This Agreement shall be construed under
·
the laws of the State ofldaho.

Section 16. Brokerage and Commissions. Seller and Buyer acknowledge
and represents that they have dealt with no broker in this transaction except the Broker(s)
specified in Section l(a) herein and Buyer hereby agrees that it shall be responsible for

payment of all Broker commissions as set forth below. Neither the Buyer nor Seller has
dealt 'With any other broker(s) in connection with this transaction. Should any other claim
for commission be established, each party hereby expressly agrees to hold the other
harmless with respect thereto to the extent that such party is shown to have been
responsible for the creation of such claim.

(a)

Representation Confirmation:

Check one ( 1) box in Section 1 below and one (l) box in Section 2 below to
confirm that in this transaction, the brokerage(s) involved had the following relationship
(s) with the BUYER(S) and SELLER(S).

Section 1:

A.

X

B.

D The broker working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL

The broker working with the BUYER(S) is acting as an AGENT for the
BUYER(S).
AGENT for the BUYER(S).

c.

D o The broker working with the BUYER(S} is acting as a NON AGENT for the
BUYER(S).

Section 2:

D

The Broker working with the SELLER(S) is acting as an AGENT for the
SELLER(S).

B. D

The broker working with the SEU.ER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL
AGENT for the SELLER(S).

A.

C.

X

The broker working with the SELLER(S) is acting as a NONAGENT for the
SELLER(S).

Each party signing this document confums that he or she bas received,
read and understood the Agency Disclosure brochure and has elected the
relationship confumed above. In addition, each party confirms that the broker's
agency office policy was made available for inspection and review. EACH
PARTY UNDERSTANDS TIJAT HE OR SHE IS A '"CUSTOMER't A.N1) IS

NOT REPRESENTED BY A BROKER UNLESS THERE IS A SIGNED
WRITTEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY REPRESENTATION.
(b)

Responsible Broker and Commissions:

The RESPONSIBLE BROKER in tltls transaction is Michael T. Keller,
Designated Broker for Thornton Oliver Keller Commercial Real Estate, LLC.
The Buyer will pay Thornton Oliver Keller Real Estat.e Company a 3%
commission.

such date shall be extended to the next day not falling on a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday observed by national banks in Boise, Idaho.
Section 18. Memorandum of Agreement. Upon Buyer's request, Seller will
execute a memorandum of this Agreement in recordable form (to be prepared by Buyer)
and Buyer may record the memorandum in fue County where 1he Property is located.
Section 19. Execution; Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in
one or more duplicate counterparts. Counterparts executed and delivered by facsimile
shall constitute originals.
Section 20.

Conditions to Closing.

This Agreement is conditioned upon:
(i)

The Seller has provided notice of the Transaction in confonnity with Rules
2002(a)(2), (c)(l), (i) and (k) and 6004(c) of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure;

(ii)

The Bankruptcy Court, pursuant to sections 363(b), (f), (h) and (m) of the
Bankruptcy Code, shall enter the Sale Order, in form and substance
satisfactory to Buyer, approving the Transaction and the sale of the
Property to Buyer upon the terms and subject to fue conditions set forth
herein, which Sale Order shall be final, in full force and effect and shall
not be or have been vacated, reversed, modified, amended, stayed or under
appeal or subject to a stay or appeal; and

(iii)

Jerry Korn has properly removed and disposed of, to Buyer's satisfaction
and in accordance with all laws, rules and regulations of any governmental
authority, any and all drums, barrels or other containers located in, on or
about the Property that may contain or have contained Hazardous
Materials (the "Disposal").

(iv)

The Custodian and fue Korns fully executing tlris Agreement, the quit
claim deed and all other documents and instruments required by the terms
of this Agreement.

In the event any of the foregoing conditions are not satisfied prior to Closing, then
Buyer may elect to terminate this Agreement in which event the Earnest Money shall be
returned to the Buyer.

Section 21.
Removal of Animals. Within two (2) business
days after entry of the Sale Order, Buyer shall deposit in escrow with Rodney T. Buttars,
Esq., counsel for Jerry Korn ("Buttars"), the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00)
to be held in a trust account maintained by Buttars (the "Animal Removal Deposit"). The ~ n
Animal Removal Deposit shall be payable by Buttars to Jerry Korn s9lely for third party, .-· P
costs actually incurred by Jerry Korn in removing all of the animals currently located on L /

the Properly in accordance with all laws, rules and regulations of any governmental
authority (the "Animal Removal"), such Animal Removal not intended to serve as
condition to Closing but rather as an obligation of Jerry Korn before and following
Closing. Within ninety (90) days of Buyer submitting the Animal Removal Deposit (the
"Animal Removal Period"), Jerry Korn covenants and agrees to satisfactorily complete
the Animal Removal, during which time Jerry Korn shall also be entitled to occupy the
Property. In the event Jerry Korn diligently pursues completion of the Animal Removal,
but is unable to complete the Animal Removal prior to the expiration of the Animal
Removal Period, the Animal Removal Period shall be automatically extended for an
additional thirty (30) days, during which time Jerry Korn shall further be entitled to
occupy the Properly. Upon completion of the Animal Removal (which completion shall
be determined in Buyer's reasonable discretion), Jerry Korn shall no longer have any right
to occupy the Property and agrees to immediately vacate the Properly and remove all of
his personal properly which he desires to remove. In the event Jerry Korn fuils to
diligently pursue the completion of the Animal Removal or fails to complete the Animal
Removal prior to the expiration of the Animal Removal Period, as extended (which
completion shall be determined in Buyer's reasonable discretion), Jerry Korn shall no
longer have any right to occupy the Properly, Jerry Korn agrees to immediately vacate the
Property and remove all of his personal property which he desires to remove, and the
Animal Removal Deposit shall be immediately returned to Buyer. Notwithstanding
anything contained herein to the contrary, upon the expiration of the Animal Removal
Period, as extended, Jerry Kom shall no longer have any right to occupy the Property and
agrees to immediately vacate the Property and remove all of his personal property which
he desires to remove. Subject to any and all additional rights of Buyer at law or in equity,
as of Closing and prior to the earlier of: (i) Jerry Korn vacating the Property as provided
for herein or (ii) the expiration of the Animal Removal Period, as extended, Buyer and
Buyer's successors, assigns, employees, agents and contractors shall be entitled to access
the Property for all reasonable purposes, including but not limited to conducting
diligence, inspections and investigations of the Property. The provisions of this Section
21 shall survive the Closing of the Transaction and the filing of record of the quit claim
deed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement as
of the dates set forth below their respective signatures.

BUYER:

~>?~
Mark Clark, Special Master and Custodian

Date:
Title:
Date:
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